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Abstract  This  paper  seeks  to  shed  further  light  on  the  capital  budgeting  techniques  used  by
Spanish companies.  Our  paper  posits  that  the  gap  between  theory  and  practice  might  be  related
to the  nature  of  sources  of  value  and  to  the  efﬁciency  of  mechanisms  aligning  managerial  and
shareholder incentives,  rather  than  to  resource  restrictions  or  model  misinterpretation.  We
analyze data  from  a  survey  conducted  in  2011,  the  ﬁnal  sample  comprising  140  non-ﬁnancial
Spanish  ﬁrms.  Our  ﬁndings  show  a  behaviour  pattern  similar  to  that  reported  in  prior  research
for ﬁrms  in  other  countries.  Particularly  noteworthy  is  that  payback  appears  to  be  the  most
widely used  tool,  while  real  options  are  used  relatively  little.  Our  results  conﬁrm  that  size  and
industry are  related  to  the  frequency  of  use  of  certain  capital  budgeting  techniques.  Further,  we
ﬁnd that  the  relevance  of  growth  opportunities  and  ﬂexibility  is  an  important  factor  explainingPayback;
Real  options;
Survey
the use  of  real  options.
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preached  the  superiority  of  models  such  as  NPV  and  real
options  since  the  mid-nineties.3 Said  academic  literature
establishes  that  NPV  and  real  option  models  provide  a  direct8  
ntroduction
idespread  opinion  among  scholars  and  practitioners  is  that
 ﬁrm’s  future  success  and  survival  ultimately  depend  on
t  getting  its  current  investment  decisions  right.  In  their
enowned  handbook  on  Corporate  Finance,  Brealey,  Myers
nd  Allen  state  that  a  good  investment  remains  good  busi-
ess  even  if  it  is  not  optimally  ﬁnanced,  but  that  a  bad
nvestment  will  be  a  wrong  decision  even  with  the  best
nancing  policy  (Brealey  et  al.,  2010).  Paradoxically,  Michael
.  Brennan  noted  that  in  1995  a  ﬁnance  instructor  had  much
ore  to  say  about  ﬁnancial  policy  than  about  capital  bud-
eting  (Brennan,  1995).
Recent  ﬁnancial  research  has  helped  cover  some  of  the
aps  in  the  investment  decision-making  problem  from  var-
ous  angles.  Agency  theory  has  helped  us  understand  that
ertain  inefﬁciencies  observed  in  corporate  investments
ay  be  explained  by  the  conﬂict  of  interests  between  insid-
rs  and  outsiders  in  a  context  of  imperfect  information.
ehavioural  ﬁnance  has  shown  how  cognitive  biases  deter-
ine  unintended  decisions  made  by  ﬁnancial  managers.
he  real  options  approach  has  provided  new  tools  suited
o  reﬂecting  the  value  of  both  the  tangible  and  intangi-
le  results  to  emerge  from  corporate  resource  allocations.
inally,  the  literature  on  corporate  ﬁnance  practices  has
elped  pinpoint  and  explore  the  gap  between  theory  and
ractice.
Our  paper  focuses  on  the  latter  research  line,  which
merged  over  half  a  century  ago  with  Miller’s  (1960)  and
stvan’s  (1961)  studies  on  capital  budgeting  practices  in  U.S.
ompanies,  and  has  subsequently  been  updated  and  has
pread  with  evidence  from  a  wide  range  of  countries.  As
 whole,  this  literature  reveals  that  managers  use  multiple
echniques,  some  of  which  are  theoretically  appropriate,
hile  others  are  less  so.  The  most  popular  evaluation
echniques  are  Net  Present  Value  (NPV),  Internal  Rate  of
eturn  (IRR),  and  Payback  (PB),  along  with  more  sophisti-
ated  models,  such  as  real  options  and  simulation.  Besides
xtending  and  empirically  illustrating  the  use  of  differ-
nt  theoretical  stringency  techniques,  these  studies  suggest
hat  certain  ﬁrm  characteristics  --  such  as  size  --  and  man-
gerial  factors  --  such  as  education  --  may  help  to  explain
he  choice  of  capital  budgeting  tools.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  twofold:  ﬁrstly,  to  extend  and
pdate  the  empirical  evidence  available  on  capital  budget-
ng  practices  in  Spanish  companies;  and,  secondly,  to  shed
urther  light  on  the  factors  explaining  the  choice  of  capi-
al  budgeting  tools  by  examining  the  possible  inﬂuences  of
ources  of  value  creation  and  mechanisms  aligning  manage-
ial  and  shareholder  incentives.  According  to  our  hypothesis,
he  ‘theory--practice’  gap  may  be  partially  explained  by
i)  the  relevance  of  growth  options  and  ﬂexibility  among
 ﬁrm’s  sources  of  value  and  (ii)  the  effectiveness  of  gov-
rnance  mechanisms  such  as  debt  or  managerial  ownership
n  aligning  interests.  Should  these  hypotheses  prove  to  be
ight,  using  of  more  simple  practices  may  merely  be  a  ques-
ion  of  convenience  or  suitability  rather  than  companies’
esources  restrictions  or  managers’  lack  of  knowledge.
The  empirical  approach  is  performed  using  information
btained  from  a  total  of  140  questionnaires  answered  by
hief  Financial  Ofﬁcers  (CFOs)  of  Spanish  companies  in
ebruary  2011.  As  with  evidence  from  other  countries,  our FP.de.  Andrés  et  al.
nalysis  indicates  that  CFOs  adopt  investment  decisions
ased  on  information  from  combining  multiple  capital  bud-
eting  methods.  Results  indicate  that  the  most  commonly
sed  techniques,  in  order,  are  as  follows:  PB,  IRR  and  NPV,
ith  few  companies  using  real  option  models.  How  often
iscounted  cash  ﬂow  techniques  are  used  is  partially  driven
y  the  variables  of  industry  and  company  size.  CFO  proﬁle
oes  not  appear  to  be  a  relevant  factor  in  explaining  capital
udgeting  practices  in  Spanish  ﬁrms.  Regarding  real  option
odels,  our  results  indicate  that  their  use  depends  mainly
n  the  relevance  of  ﬂexibility  and  growth  options  as  com-
any  value  sources  and,  to  some  extent,  on  certain  incentive
lignment  mechanisms.
The  remainder  of  the  work  is  organized  as  follows:  the
econd  section  reviews  previous  literature.  The  third  sec-
ion  sets  out  the  hypotheses.  The  fourth  section  describes
ata  collection,  sample  and  econometric  models.  Descrip-
ive  results  as  well  as  the  test  of  explanatory  hypotheses  are
hown  and  discussed  in  the  ﬁfth  section.  The  work  concludes
ith  a  discussion  of  the  main  results  and  limitations.
heory and practice of capital budgeting
ractices
nterest  in  understanding  the  practices  used  by  CFOs  when
eciding  which  investment  opportunities  to  undertake  ﬁrst
merged  in  the  early  60s.  Studies  by  Miller  (1960)  and  Istvan
1961)  on  U.S.  companies  herald  the  beginning  of  a  series  of
iagnostics  in  companies  worldwide,  which  continues  to  the
resent  day.  Evidence  in  the  60s  and  70s  reﬂected  a  certain
anagerial  tendency  to  gradually  use  theoretically  superior
odels  based  on  discounted  cash  ﬂows.  At  the  same  time,
ertain  studies  began  to  report  an  increasing  gap  between
nancial  theory  and  ﬁrms’  practices.  Through  an  in-depth
nalysis  of  eight  cases,  Mao  (1970)  found  that  managers  pre-
erred  to  use  simple  tools  such  as  PB  or  the  accounting  proﬁt
riteria,  as  opposed  to  models  which  were  more  appropriate
rom  a theoretical  perspective,  such  as  NPV  or  IRR.  Two  years
ater,  Klamer  (1972)  concluded  that  the  ‘‘new’’  advanced
heory  in  the  50s  was  put  into  practice  as  of  the  70s.
Since  then,  the  ‘theory--practice’  gap  has  continued
o  grow,  ﬁrstly  due  to  greater  scientiﬁc  production  in
nance  and  secondly  due  to  the  gradual  adoption  of  new
apital  budgeting  tools  by  ﬁrms,  similar  to  the  gradual
cceptance  of  other  corporate  decision-making  techniques
Triantis,  2005),  but  lagging  far  behind  the  speed  with  which
ntrepreneurs  have  embraced  other  kinds  of  innovations.
Recent  literature  shows  that,  broadly  speaking,  man-
gers  continue  to  use  simple  tools  which  are  theoretically
ess  appropriate  and  accurate,  while  more  recent  and
ophisticated  techniques  are  relegated  to  analyzing  spe-
iﬁc  investment  projects  in  just  a  few  large  companies
Verbeeten,  2006).  From  a  theoretical  standpoint,  the  most
idely  recommended  ‘Corporate  Finance’  handbooks  have3 See, among others, Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers and
ranklin Allen: Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill/Irwin)
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estimate  of  each  investment’s  contribution  to  the  value  cre-
ation  objective.  Both  models  calculate  the  expected  net
increase  in  a  ﬁrm’s  market  value  driven  by  undertaking  an
investment,  which  is  deﬁned  by  the  difference  between
what  will  be  obtained  (the  project’s  value)  and  what  has  to
be  paid  (the  project’s  price).  NPV  calculates  the  project’s
value  from  the  expected  cash  ﬂows  to  emerge  and  the  main
ﬁnancial  principles  such  as  the  time  value  of  money  and  the
risk-return  market  relation.  The  real  options  model  extends
traditional  NPV  to  incorporate  the  value  of  ‘growth’  and
‘ﬂexibility’  options:  possible  actions  to  be  taken  in  response
to  new  information  over  time.
In  contrast  to  this  almost  universal  consensus  among  aca-
demics  favouring  NPV  and  real  options,  corporate  practice
has  shown  PB  and  IRR  to  be  the  preferred  tools  of  managers
in  most  companies.  Papers  such  as  Block  (1997),  Payne  et  al.
(1999)  and  Graham  and  Harvey  (2001)  indicate  that  PB  and
IRR  remained  the  most  popular  tools  among  managers  in  U.S.
companies  by  the  end  of  the  90s.  More  recently  such  prefer-
ences  seem  to  have  been  inverted  in  some  countries.  NPV  is
the  most  widely  used  method  in  Anglo-American  countries
like  the  U.S.  (Ryan  and  Ryan,  2002),  Canada  (Bennouna
et  al.,  2010;  Baker  et  al.,  2011a),  the  UK  (Alkaraan  and
Northcott,  2006),  and  Australia  (Truong  et  al.,  2008).  How-
ever,  in  other  European  countries  and  Asia  the  prevalence
of  IRR  and  particularly  of  PB  continues  to  increase.  This
is  the  case  of  Germany  (Brounen  et  al.,  2004;  Sridharan
and  Schuele,  2008),  Sweden  (Holmen  and  Pramborg,  2009),
and  Spain  (Iturralde  and  Maseda,  2004),  in  Europe;  or  Japan
(Shinoda,  2010),  China  (Hermes  et  al.,  2007),  Hong  Kong  and
Singapore  (Kester  et  al.,  1999;  Leon  et  al.,  2008),  in  Asia.
Table  1  shows  a  summary  of  the  empirical  evidence  on  the
most  frequently  used  methods  in  different  countries.
The  ﬁnance  literature  has  sought  to  explain  the  gap
between  what  is  theoretically  right  and  what  is  actually  pre-
ferred  in  practice.  Most  explanations  are  connected  with
managers’  preferences  and  limitations.  For  example,  the
strong  preference  for  IRR  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the
information  provided  ‘‘ﬁts’’  in  better  with  managers’  cog-
nitive  process  (Evans  and  Forbes,  1993).  Burns  and  Walker
(1997)  and  Cohen  and  Yagil  (2007)  suggest  that  IRR  is  chosen
because  managers  are  more  comfortable  with  percent  val-
ues,  which  facilitate  comparison  among  projects  and  with
hurdle  rates  or  multiple  and  daily  ﬁnancial  references  (such
as  capital  costs,  interest  rates,  risk  premiums  and  inﬂation).
PB  seems  to  be  chosen  due  to  its  ease  of  computation  and
understanding.  Although  a  liquidity  criterion,  managers  use
it  to  ‘‘provide  a  quick  look  at  risk’’  (Burns  and  Walker,  1997),
as  a  consequence  of  managers’  cognitively  associating  quick
recovery  with  less  exposure  to  future  uncertainty.  Managers’
lack  of  conﬁdence  and  risk  aversion  also  help  to  explain
that  ‘old’  and  ‘familiar’  practices  are  not  abandoned  but
continue  to  be  used  as  a  complement  to  results  obtained
from  more  recent  and  theoretically  appropriate  proposals
(Stanley  and  Block,  1984;  Kim  et  al.,  1986).  By  accumu-
lating  multiple  models  and  results,  managers  may  feel  that
their  analysis  is  enriched  and  their  responsibility  is  reduced
or Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerﬁeld and Jeffrey Jaffe: Cor-
porate Finance (McGraw-Hill/Irwin).
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Arnold  and  Hatzopoulos,  2000),  as  a  consequence  of  ‘‘the
ore  the  merrier’’  approach  (Pike,  1996).
Such  arguments  suggest  that  the  ‘theory--practice’  gap
s  mainly  caused  by  practitioner  deviation:  managers  fail  to
pply  the  models  that  should  be  used.  Much  of  the  empiri-
al  literature  suggests  that  if  simple  practices  prevail  over
ore  appropriate  approaches,  it  is  due  to  the  net  balance
f  the  costs  and  beneﬁts  involved  in  acquiring  analytical
nd  computing  tools  and  hiring  highly-qualiﬁed  staff  able  to
dopt  sophisticated  models  (Verbeeten,  2006;  Block,  2007).
his  hypothesis  has  been  tested  by  exploring  the  relationship
etween  the  frequency  of  use  of  different  capital  budgeting
echniques  and  a  number  of  characteristics  of  the  ﬁrm  and
ts  managers.
Empirical  results  show  that  a  ﬁrm’s  capital  budgeting
ractices  mainly  depend  on  its  size  (Schall  et  al.,  1978;
lock,  1997;  Brounen  et  al.,  2004;  Danielson  and  Scott,  2006;
ridharan  and  Schuele,  2008),  industry  (Schall  et  al.,  1978;
chall  and  Sundem,  1980;  Block,  2005;  Rayo  et  al.,  2007),
ncertainty  sources  (Verbeeten,  2006)  or  the  home  coun-
ry’s  level  of  economic  development  (Hermes  et  al.,  2007).
long  with  these  ﬁrm  characteristics,  managers’  proﬁle  is
lso  found  to  inﬂuence  capital  budgeting  practices.  Edu-
ation  (Graham  and  Harvey,  2001;  Brounen  et  al.,  2004),
ge  (Graham  and  Harvey,  2001;  Hermes  et  al.,  2007)  and
nvolvement  in  the  decision-making  process  (Rayo  et  al.,
007) are  three  of  the  variables  which  show  the  greatest
xplanatory  power.  Overall,  these  results  suggest  that  larger
ompanies  -- and  presumably  those  with  more  resources  --
espond  to  greater  investment  uncertainty  by  hiring  man-
gers  with  suitable  competences  and  interest  in  adopting
ore  sophisticated  practices  (Verbeeten,  2006).
ypotheses
he  relation  between  a  ﬁrm’s  size  and  its  managers’  educa-
ion  and  capital  budgeting  practices,  as  shown  by  empirical
vidence,  may  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  access  to  sophis-
icated  quantitative  models.  Yet,  said  features  can  hardly
ustify  the  choice  of  estimating  a  project’s  PB  instead  of  cal-
ulating  its  NPV.  Once  the  complex  task  of  predicting  future
ash  ﬂows  is  completed,  the  additional  complexity  of  NPV
is-à-vis  PB  is  conﬁned  to  a  basic  understanding  of  ﬁnance
rinciples  and  indeed  not  even  that  if  PB  is  computed  in  its
iscounted  version.
A  complementary  explanation  might  be  based  on  the  mis-
lignment  of  manager  and  shareholder  incentives  and  the
ature  of  a  ﬁrm’s  sources  of  value.  Jensen  and  Meckling
1976)  and  Myers  (1977)  helped  us  understand  the  inﬂu-
nce  of  incentive  systems  and  control  mechanisms  on  the
fﬁciency  of  corporate  behaviour.  Managerial  discretion,
isaligned  interests  and  information  asymmetries  explains
hy  corporate  decisions  may  diverge  from  optimal  ones.  In
 context  of  incomplete  contracts  and  imperfect  observa-
ion,  corporate  investment  decisions  may  be  used  to  satisfy
anagerial  interests  at  the  expense  of  shareholder  wealth.
part  from  perquisite  consumption  or  non-pecuniary  bene-
ts,  managers  may  derive  private  beneﬁts  from  promoting
nproﬁtable  investments  which,  for  instance,  reduce  the
isk  of  their  undiversiﬁed  human  capital,  increase  the  size
40  P.de.  Andrés  et  al.
Table  1  Most  commonly  used  capital  budgeting  technique.  This  paper  shows  prior  studies  on  capital  budgeting  practices  accord-
ing to  the  sample’s  country  and  most  frequently  used  technique.  Columns  indicate  the  most  commonly  used  technique,  where
DCF =  discounted  cash  ﬂow  methods  (NPV  or  IRR);  NPV  =  Net  Present  Value;  IRR  =  Internal  Return  Rate;  PB  =  payback;  RO  =  real
options; ARR  =  accounting  rate  of  return;  ROI  =  return  on  investment.
Country  Technique
DCF  (NPV  or
IRR)
NPV  IRR  PB  RO  ARR  ROI
USA  Chen  (2008)  Trahan  and  Gitman
(1995)  and  Ryan  and
Ryan  (2002)
Bierman  (1993),
Burns  and  Walker
(1997),  Payne  et  al.
(1999)  and  Graham
and  Harvey  (2001)
Mao  (1970),  Schall
et al.  (1978),  Moore
and  Reichert  (1983)
and  Block  (1997)
Istvan
(1961)
Miller
(1960)
Canada  Bennouna  et  al.
(2010)  and  Baker
et  al.  (2011a)
Payne  et  al.  (1999)
and  Graham  and
Harvey  (2001)
UK  Busby  and
Pitts  (1997)
Alkaraan  and
Northcott  (2006)
Arnold  and
Hatzopoulos  (2000)
Pike  (1996),  Drury
and  Tayles  (1996)  and
Brounen  et  al.  (2004)
Netherlands  Brounen  et  al.  (2004)
and  Hermes  et  al.
(2007)
Germany  Sridharan  and
Schuele  (2008)
Brounen  et  al.  (2004)
and  Sridharan  and
Schuele  (2008)
France  Brounen
et  al.
(2004)
Spain  Ayala  and  Rodríguez
(2000),  Iturralde  and
Maseda  (2004)  and
Rayo  et  al.  (2007)
Sweden  Sandahl  and  Sjögren
(2003)  and  Holmen
and  Pramborg  (2009)
Australia  Kester  et  al.  (1999)
and  Truong  et  al.
(2008)
Hong  Kong  Ann  et  al.  (1987)  and
Kester  et  al.  (1999)
Indonesia  Kester  et  al.  (1999)  Leon  et  al.  (2008)
Malaysia  Ann  et  al.  (1987)  and
Kester  et  al.  (1999)
Philippines  Kester  et  al.  (1999)
Singapore  Ann  et  al.  (1987)  and
Kester  et  al.  (1999)
South  Africa  Hall
and
Millard
(2010)
Argentina  Pereiro
(2006)
Japan  Shinoda  (2010)
Colombia  Velez  and  Nieto
(1986)
China  Hermes  et  al.  (2007)
Persian  Gulf  Chazi  et  al.  (2010)
Latin-America  Maquieira  et  al.
(2012)
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and  Northcott,  2006;  Truong  et  al.,  2008;  Shinoda,  2010).
Its  high  computational  complexity  (Newton  and  Pearson,Capital  budgeting  practices  in  Spain  
and  future  budget  of  their  business  units  or  produce  short-
term  cash  ﬂows  linked  to  their  own  remuneration.
The  misalignment  of  interests  that  drives  inefﬁcient  cor-
porate  investments  will  have  a  more  ‘deliberate’  impact
on  managerial  decision-making  and  choice  of  capital  bud-
geting  techniques  (Triantis,  2005).  In  fact,  the  use  of  PB
is  clear  evidence  of  such  problems.  Managerial  interest  in
future  promotion,  salary  increase,  or  simply  reappointment,
explain  their  desire  to  achieve  short-term  performance  and
subsequent  use  of  ‘payback’  metrics.  The  longer  the  time
required  to  reach  the  break-even  point,  the  greater  the  risk
assumed,  not  by  shareholders,  but  by  managers  who  regu-
larly  have  to  report  to  investors  for  their  capital  investments
decisions  based  on  actual  short-term  earnings.
Something  similar  happens  with  the  use  of  IRR  versus
NPV.  Although  both  NPV  and  IRR  achieve  the  same  result
with  regard  to  the  acceptance  of  single  projects,  they  may
report  contrary  proposals  when  selecting  among  mutually
exclusive  projects.  One  reason  is  that  NPV  is  an  absolute
measure  of  value  creation,  whereas  IRR  is  a  relative  measure
of  the  return  per  unit  of  capital  invested.  When  compar-
ing  projects  with  different  sizes  (outlays),  IRR  opts  ceteris
paribus,  for  projects  which  require  a  smaller  outlay  and
thereby  involve  less  reliance  on  external  capital  sources,
with  managerial  action  being  subject  to  control  market
supervision  less  often.
The  tendency  towards  cash-consuming  long-term  perfor-
mance  projects  is  even  greater  when  applying  real  option
models.  One  main  advantage  of  real  options  is  to  provide
appropriate  value  measures  for  investments  whose  results
are  partly  intangible  and  that  only  after  later-stage  com-
mitments  are  transformed  into  cash  ﬂows.  The  use  of
real  options  encourages  riskier  projects  to  be  accepted
whose  values  come  from  their  embedded  opportunities
for  growth/abandonment  in  the  future.  Due  to  their  real
options,  these  projects  may  generate  shareholder  value
although  immediate  results  may  prove  unattractive  vis-à-vis
achieving  managers’  career  objectives.
The  agency  theory  has  extensively  studied  a  wide  range
of  mechanisms  which  may  inﬂuence  efﬁciency  in  a  ﬁrm’s
investment  behaviour.  Among  the  mechanisms  that  con-
tribute  to  aligning  managerial  and  shareholder  incentives,
the  ﬁnancial  literature  has  studied  the  role  played  by  debt
or  managerial  ownership  (Harris  and  Raviv,  1991).  Debt  dis-
ciplines  managers  by  imposing  a  regular  commitment  to
pay  out  interest  and  make  principal  repayments,  limiting
manager  access  to  ‘free  cash-ﬂow’  which  might  be  used  on
unproﬁtable  investments.  Failing  to  attend  debt  obligations
threatens  not  only  shareholder  wealth  and  business  con-
tinuation,  but  also  --  and  ﬁrstly  --  managers’  position  and
reputation  (Jensen,  1986).  Managerial  ownership  directly
brings  managers’  interests  into  line  with  those  of  share-
holders,  thereby  reducing  the  likelihood  of  encouraging
opportunistic  investments  aimed  at  satisfying  managers’
own  interests.  As  managers  increase  their  ownership  stake,
they  are  more  likely  to  employ  available  resources  in  cre-
ating  value  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976;  Jensen,  1993;
McConnell  and  Servaes,  1995).We  argue  that  the  same  incentive  alignment  mechanisms
which  inﬂuence  investment  behaviour  may  affect  the  choice
of  theoretically  appropriate  capital  budgeting  tools.  Accord-
ing  to  Brounen  et  al.  (2004),  ﬁrms  that  attempt  to  maximize
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hareholder  wealth  are  likely  to  use  theoretically  correct
apital  techniques.  Baker  et  al.  (2011a)  claim  that  weaker
orporate  governance  in  Canadian  ﬁrms  results  in  a  failure  to
se  corporate  ﬁnance  practices  that  maximize  shareholder
alue.  Triantis  (2005)  considers  that  applying  real  option
odels  by  managers  requires  deliberate  alignment  of  man-
gerial  and  shareholder  incentives.  Prior  empirical  evidence
rovides  some  support  for  such  an  inﬂuence  on  capital  bud-
eting  practices.  For  example,  Graham  and  Harvey  (2001)
ocument  a  signiﬁcant  effect  of  debt  while  Brounen  et  al.
2004)  ﬁnd  a  relation  with  shareholder  orientation.  The
ffect  of  these  mechanisms  on  capital  budgeting  practices
nspires  our  ﬁrst  hypothesis:
ypothesis  1.  The  effect  of  mechanisms  aligning  manage-
ial  and  shareholder  incentives,  such  as  debt  and  managerial
wnership,  increases  the  propensity  to  use  theoretically
ore  appropriate  models,  such  as  NPV,  real  option  models
r  simulation  models.
Regarding  the  nature  of  the  sources  of  value,  the  real
ption  approach  has  shown  that  the  value  created  by  a
orporate  investment  comes  not  only  from  the  future  cash
ows  to  emerge.  Corporate  investments  also  generate  other
non-monetary’  results,  such  as  knowledge,  brand  image  or
exibility,  whose  value  effect  may  be  higher  than  that  from
ash  ﬂows.  Value  created  by  this  type  of  results  derives  from
he  new  possibilities  (options)  they  provide  to  the  company
o  take  actions/decisions  which  would  otherwise  not  have
een  available.  These  opportunities  are  the  so-called  ‘real
ptions’  which  enable  the  ﬁrm  to  invest  in  a  new  project,  to
xpand/reduce  an  ongoing  one,  to  abandon  it,  to  adapt  and
e-deploy  assets,  to  alter  output  or  input  mixes,  and  so  on.
tandard  discounted  cash  ﬂow  techniques,  such  as  NPV,  are
ppropriate  for  estimating  the  value  created  by  ‘given’  cash
ows,  yet  fail  to  capture  the  value  of  capabilities,  which  are
he  natural  subject  matter  of  real  option  models.
As  it  is  hard  to  envisage  corporate  investments  not
ncluding  any  of  these  intangible  results  (Myers,  1996),  the
onclusion  is  that  the  most  commonly  used  capital  budgeting
ool  should  be  the  real  option  model  (Myers,  1984;  Palacios
t  al.,  2002).  This  notion  is  further  strengthened  by  the
ide  explanatory  power  of  real  options,  as  managers  that
ave  never  heard  of  this  model  decide  and  act  as  if  they
ere  following  its  main  precepts  (Myers,  1996),  for  exam-
le,  when  undertaking  an  R&D  project  with  negative  NPV  as
 means  of  discovering  fresh  opportunities  or  when  enter-
ng  unknown  and  seemingly  unproﬁtable  new  markets  due
o  their  strategic  value.4
With  the  ten  years  once  predicted  by  Copeland  (2000)  for
eal  options  to  replace  discounted  cash  ﬂow  model  having
ow  elapsed,  problems  preventing  the  practical  implemen-
ation  of  what  is  --  at  least  in  theory  --  a  better  model
learly  exist.  Recent  studies  show  the  real  option  approach  is
eing  gradually  adopted,  although  it  remains  some  consider-
ble  distance  behind  discounted  cash  ﬂow  models  (Alkaraan994;  Mathews  et  al.,  2007),  lack  of  understanding  of  its
4 See Rayo and Cortés (2007).
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educational  background,  46.6%  of  CFOs  hold  an  MBA  or  Mas-2  
ain  principles  (Myers,  1996;  Block,  2007;  Rayo  et  al.,  2007;
aker  et  al.,  2011b)  or  the  fact  that  some  of  the  underlying
ssumptions  do  not  literally  stand  up  to  scrutiny  (Lander  and
inches,  1998)  are  some  of  the  statements  used  to  justify  the
eluctance  to  apply  the  approach.
Such  explanations  do  not  exactly  project  a  favourable
mage  of  managers,  who  seem  to  lack  sufﬁcient  resources  or
ncentives  to  adopt  approaches  which,  although  better  than
hose  usually  employed,  demand  more  effort  and  involve
reater  complexity.  As  mentioned  above,  this  diagnosis  is
urther  supported  by  the  empirical  results  which  relate  a
rm’s  size  and  managers’  education  to  capital  budgeting
ractices.  In  contrast  to  this  rather  pessimistic  hypothesis,
 more  benevolent  view  considers  that  the  chosen  tech-
iques,  while  not  the  most  sophisticated  or  innovative,  are
hose  most  suited  to  the  nature  of  each  investment’s  main
ources  of  value.  In  their  empirical  study  on  Canadian  ﬁrms’
se  of  real  options,  Baker  et  al.  (2011b)  ﬁnd  that  the  sec-
nd  main  reason  managers  give  for  ‘not  using  real  options’  is
he  ‘lack  of  applicability’  to  their  business.  Similarly,  Block
2007)  ﬁnds  that  real  option  models  are  more  frequently
sed  in  speciﬁc  industries  and  for  evaluating  particular  types
f  project.  This  evidence  supports  the  idea  that  adopting
uch  a  practice  may  depend  on  the  nature  of  a  project’s
ources  of  value.  Regardless  of  how  often  they  are  used
n  all  types  of  investments,  the  relative  relevance  of  real
ptions  may  vary  substantially  from  one  project  to  another.
uch  a  discrepancy  in  terms  of  relevance  is  found  by  Kester
1984)  when  estimating  the  relative  effect  of  growth  options
n  a  ﬁrm’s  market  value,  which  varies  from  7  to  88%  from
ne  business  to  another.5 This  line  of  reasoning  supports
ur  second  hypothesis,  which  relates  the  inﬂuence  of  the
ature  of  sources  of  value  on  the  use  of  the  real  option
odel:
ypothesis  2.  The  relevance  of  growth  options  and  ﬂex-
bility  as  sources  of  value  of  a  ﬁrm’s  capital  investments
ncreases  the  propensity  to  use  real  options  models.
ample, variables and econometric models
ur  empirical  analysis  of  capital  budgeting  practices  is  based
n  information  obtained  from  a  questionnaire  addressed  to
FOs  of  the  2000  largest  non-ﬁnancial  Spanish  companies.6
 draft  survey  was  ﬁrst  reviewed  by  other  two  scholars,
ach  of  whom  were,  respectively,  experts  in  questionnaire
esign  and  corporate  ﬁnance.  The  reviewed  questionnaire
as  then  submitted  to  previous  testing  by  four  CFOs  from
ifferent  industries.  The  ﬁnal  questionnaire  was  accompa-
ied  by  a  cover  letter  explaining  the  research  objectives
nd  guaranteeing  anonymity  of  answers.  The  data  collec-
ion  process  began  in  February  2011  and  concluded  in  June,
5 In a similar analysis, Alessandri et al. (2007) ﬁnd values between
8 and 86% depending on a ﬁrm’s sector of activity.
6 Mailing information was obtained from ‘‘The 5,000 largest
panish companies’’ directory published in 2010 by the magazine
ctualidad Económica.  This ranking is based on ﬁrm sales revenue
s of December 2009. As in similar papers, ﬁnancial companies were
ot included, due to their special characteristics.
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ith  a  total  of  140  valid  answers  and  a  response  rate  of
.0%.
The  survey  was  designed  to  obtain  information  concern-
ng  the  type  and  frequency  of  capital  budgeting  tools  used;
he  nature  of  investment  sources  of  value  and  relevance;  the
ffect  of  mechanisms  aligning  managerial  and  shareholder
ncentives;  ﬁrm  characteristics  and  CFO  features.  The  ques-
ionnaire  mainly  comprised  multi-choice  questions,  where
espondents  were  asked  to  score  answers  on  a  scale  of  ﬁve,
rom  lowest  to  highest.7
To  check  possible  response  bias,  we  conducted  the  fol-
owing  two  tests.  First,  following  Graham  and  Harvey  (2001),
nd  Brounen  et  al.  (2004),  we  compared  sales  revenue  of
esponding  and  original  population.  Differences-of-means
est  results  indicate  no  statistically  signiﬁcant  disparities
etween  groups  (p-value  >0.1).  Additionally,  we  checked
hether  the  sales  revenue  of  early  respondents  differs
rom  that  of  late  respondents.8 Again,  differences-of-means
est  results  fail  to  detect  statistically  signiﬁcant  variances
etween  these  groups  (p-value  >0.1).
ample:  ﬁrm  and  CFO  characteristics
ig.  1  summarizes  the  information  on  the  main  characteris-
ics  of  ﬁrms  in  our  sample  regarding  sales  revenue  (Fig.  1A),
ndustry  (Fig.  1B),  legal  status  (Fig.  1C),  and  foreign  invest-
ents  (Fig.  1D).  Despite  being  among  the  group  of  the
000  largest  Spanish  companies,  9.6%  of  ﬁrms  in  the  sam-
le  have  annual  sales  below  50  million,  and  only  14.8%
how  sales  exceeding  1000  million.  Most  companies  ﬁt  into
he  category  of  sales  between  100  and  500  million  euros
over  44%  of  companies).  As  regards  their  core  industry
lassiﬁcation,  the  most  populated  groups  are  Manufacturing
36.8%)  and  Services  (32.4%).  Other  industries  represented
n  the  sample  were  Consumer  Goods  (14.7),  Energy  (8.8%),
eal  Estate  Services  (5.9%)  and  Telecommunications  (1.5%).
ccording  to  their  legal  status,  77.2%  of  companies  are  Cor-
orations  and  22.8%  are  Limited  Liability  Companies.  Finally,
ig.  1D  shows  that  53.1%  of  the  sample  companies  invest
verseas.
Fig.  2  shows  CFOs’  proﬁles  according  to  their  age
Fig.  2A),  time  in  their  positions  (Fig.  2B),  educational  back-
round  (Fig.  2C),  board  of  director  position  (Fig.  2D)  and
nvolvement  in  capital  investment  decisions  (Fig.  2E).  45.2%
f  respondent  CFOs  are  between  40  and  49  years  old,  5.2%
re  over  60  years  old  and  one  CFO  reported  being  under
0  years  of  age.9 The  average  time  they  had  been  working
as  20.6  years,  while  the  average  time  in  the  current  ﬁrm
nd  position  are  12.9  and  9.5  years  respectively.  As  regardser’s  Degree  in  Finance.  Finally,  less  than  one  third  of  CFOs
29.6%)  are  members  of  the  board  of  directors  and  most  feel
7 A few open-ended questions were used such as sales revenue,
atio of debt on total assets and CFOs’ time working, time working
n the ﬁrm and time as CFO.
8 See Armstrong and Overton (1977). We  considered early respon-
ents as those returning the survey by March 31, 2011, 40 days after
he mailing date.
9 In Graham and Harvey (2001) and Brounen et al. (2004) most
FOs in the samples were between 50 and 59 years old.
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the  coefﬁcients  to  be  estimated;  and  ej is  an  error  term.
Eq.  M1  is  estimated  for  each  of  the  six  capital  budgeting
techniques  considered.
10 When the dependent variable measures ordered multiple-choiceFigure  1  Features  of  companies  in  the  sample.  Panel  A:  sale
euros). Panel  B:  industry  sector.  Distribution  of  companies  by  c
Companies (LLC)  and  Corporations  (Corp).  Panel  D:  foreign  inve
fairly  (35.6%)  or  highly  involved  (44.4%)  in  their  ﬁrm’s  capital
investment  decisions.
Variables  and  econometric  models
The  models  used  to  test  our  hypotheses  relate  frequency
of  use  of  several  capital  budgeting  tools  to  independent
variables  measuring  the  effect  of  mechanisms  aligning  man-
agerial  and  shareholder  incentives  (Hypothesis  1)  and  the
relevance  of  growth  options  and  ﬂexibility  as  sources  of
value  (Hypothesis  2).  To  compare  the  explanatory  power
of  our  hypothesis  with  ﬁndings  in  previous  literature,  our
models  include  the  control  variables  of  the  size  of  the  ﬁrm
and  CFO’s  educational  level.
The  dependent  variable  is  deﬁned  as  the  frequency  with
which  each  capital  budgeting  tool  is  used  by  CFOs  accord-
ing  to  the  scores  given  on  a  scale  of  5  levels  (from  ‘‘never’’
to  ‘‘always’’).  The  capital  budgeting  techniques  considered
are  NPV,  IRR,  PB,  real  options,  simulation  and  sensitivity
analysis.  The  categorized  nature  of  the  dependent  vari-
able,  which  measures  ordered  multiple-choice  answers,
a
t
t
2tribution  of  companies  according  to  sales  revenue  (millions  of
usiness.  Panel  C:  legal  status.  Percentage  of  Limited  Liability
nts.  Percentage  of  ﬁrms  investing  overseas.
akes  ordered  probit  estimation  the  appropriate  economet-
ic  model  for  testing  Hypotheses  1  and  2.10
In  order  to  test  Hypothesis  1,  we  estimate  the  following
quation:
echniquej =  ˇ  · incentivesj +    ·  sizej +    ·  mbaj +  ej (M1)
here  j indexes  each  of  the  140  companies  in  the  sample;
echnique  measures  the  frequency  of  use  of  each  capi-
al  budgeting  technique;  incentives  is  a  set  of  mechanisms
ligning  managerial  and  shareholder  incentives,  size  and
ba  are  control  variables  which,  respectively,  measure  the
ize  of  the  ﬁrm  and  CFO’s  educational  level;  ˇ,    and    arenswers, linear estimation techniques would present errors related
o interpreting value distances, while multivariate logit and mul-
ivariate probit fail to consider the order of responses (Greene,
012).
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The  variables  used  to  capture  the  effect  of  mecha-
isms  aligning  managerial  and  shareholder  incentives  are
ong-term  debt  (ltdebt),  managerial  ownership  (ownership),
nd  frequency  of  ﬁrm  valuation  (valuation). Graham  and
arvey  (2001)  are  pioneers  in  the  analysis  of  relationships
etween  capital  budgeting  practices  and  the  variables  of
orporate  borrowing  and  managerial  ownership.  The  effect
f  the  variables  of  long-term  debt  and  managerial  ownership
n  aligning  managerial  and  shareholder  incentives  is  sup-
orted  by  works  such  as  Jensen  (1986)  and  Connelly  et  al.
2010),  among  others.  Andrés  et  al.  (2000)  and  Miguel  et  al.
2004)  ﬁnd  empirical  evidence  illustrating  this  role  of  long-
erm  debt  and  managerial  ownership,  respectively,  in  the
ase  of  Spanish  companies.  Additionally,  we  deﬁne  the  vari-
ble  of  frequency  of  ﬁrm  valuation  (valuation)  to  reﬂect
ow  regularly  managers  estimate  the  value  of  the  ﬁrm  in  a
ear.  The  more  frequently  this  value  is  estimated  by  man-
gers,  the  higher  their  interest  in  value  creation  (Rappaport,
997).  This  variable  thus  provides  information  about  a  ﬁrm’s
hareholder  orientation  and  the  level  of  managerial  and
hareholder  interest  alignment.
The  values  for  these  three  variables  are  obtained  directly
rom  CFOs’  answers  to  the  survey.  Long-term  debt  (ltdebt) is
eﬁned  as  the  quotient  of  long-term  debt  and  total  assets.
tcational  background.  Percentage  of  CFOs  with  MBA  or  Master’s
on  the  board  of  directors.  Panel  E:  involvement  in  investment
 company’s  investment  decisions.
anagerial  ownership  (ownership) is  a dummy  taking  the
alue  1  if  a  CFO  owns  common  stock  of  his  ﬁrm  and  zero
therwise.  The  variable  of  ﬁrm  valuation  (valuation)  is  a
ategorized  variable  which  takes  ﬁve  levels,  from  never  to
aily,  according  to  the  frequency  with  which  the  ﬁrm  value
s  estimated  by  CFOs.  The  control  variables  of  size  of  the
rm  (size) and  managerial  education  (mba) are  deﬁned  as
n  Graham  and  Harvey  (2001),  respectively,  by  the  natural
ogarithm  of  sales  and  a  dummy  that  takes  the  value  1  if  CFOs
old  a  postgraduate  degree,  such  as  an  MBA  or  a  Master’s
egree  in  Finance,  and  zero  otherwise.
Results  from  correlation  analysis  of  independent  varia-
les  suggest  evaluating  the  effect  of  managerial  ownership
ownership)  and  frequency  of  ﬁrm  valuation  (valuation)  sep-
rately.  We  therefore  split  Model  M1  into  the  following  two
odel  speciﬁcations:
echniquej =  ˇ1 · ltdebtj +  ˇ2 ·  ownershipj +    · sizej
+    ·  mbaj +  ej (M1.1)echniquej =  ˇ1 · ltdebtj +  ˇ3 ·  valuationj +    · sizej
+    ·  mbaj +  ej (M1.2)
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In  order  to  test  Hypothesis  2,  we  estimate  the  following
equation:
techniquej =  ϕ  ·  sourcesj +    ·  sizej +    ·  mbaj +  ej (M2)
where  sources  is  a  set  of  variables  which  reﬂect  the  nature
of  a  ﬁrm’s  sources  of  value,  ϕ  captures  the  coefﬁcient  to  be
estimated,  and  the  remaining  variables  are  the  same  as  in
Model  M1.
The  nature  of  sources  of  value  (sources)  is  captured  by  a
set  of  variables  measuring  the  relevance  of  growth  options
(growth)  and  ﬂexibility  to  switch  investment  inputs  (switch),
to  modify  investment  size  (modify),  and  to  defer  invest-
ments  (defer).  The  relevance  of  this  type  of  real  options  in
a  ﬁrm’s  market  value  is  supported  by  works  such  as  Kester
(1984)  for  the  option  to  grow,  McDonald  and  Siegel  (1986)
for  the  option  to  postpone  investments,  Kulatilaka  (1993)  for
the  option  to  switch  investment  inputs,  and  Pindyck  (1988)
for  the  option  to  modify  a  project’s  size.
We  obtain  evidence  for  these  variables  directly  from
CFOs’  answers  to  the  survey.  We  asked  CFOs  to  score  on
a  scale  of  ﬁve  levels  (from  lowest  to  highest)  the  rele-
vance  of  each  option  in  the  whole  of  their  ﬁrm’s  sources  of
value.  Speciﬁcally,  the  values  for  the  growth  options  variable
(growth)  reﬂect  the  frequency  with  which  past  investments
open  up  new  opportunities  to  invest,  and  the  values  for  the
variables  of  the  options  to  switch  inputs  (switch),  modify
investment  size  (modify),  and  defer  investments  (defer),
indicate  the  relative  importance  of  these  possibilities  in
their  usual  capital  investments.
Results  from  correlation  analysis  of  independent  varia-
bles  in  Model  M2  suggest  examining  separately  the  effect  of
the  option  to  switch  inputs  (switch)  and  resize  investments
(modify)  from  the  effect  of  the  option  to  defer  (defer).
We  therefore  split  Model  M2  into  the  following  two  model
speciﬁcations:
techniquej =  ϕ1 ·  growthj +  ϕ2 ·  switchj +  ϕ3 ·  modifyj
+    ·  sizej +    ·  mbaj +  ej (M2.1)
techniquej =  ϕ1 ·  growthj +  ϕ4 ·  deferj
+    ·  sizej +    ·  mbaj +  ej (M2.2)
Finally,  we  test  Hypotheses  1  and  2  jointly  by  estimating  a
model  which  includes  both  groups  of  independent  variables
of  alignment  mechanisms  and  sources  of  value.  Results  from
correlation  analysis  of  these  independent  variables  again
suggest  considering  the  variables  of  growth, switch, mod-
ify,  ltdebt  and  ownership  in  Model  M3.1,  and  the  variables
of  growth,  switch, modify  and  valuation  in  Model  M3.2:
techniquej =  ϕ1 ·  growthj +  ϕ2 ·  switchj +  ϕ3 ·  modifyj
+  ˇ1 ·  ltdebtj +  ˇ2 ·  ownership
+    ·  sizej +    ·  mbaj +  ej (M3.1)techniquej =  ϕ1 ·  growthj +  ϕ2 ·  switchj +  ϕ3 ·  modifyj
+  ˇ1 ·  ltdebtj +  ˇ3 ·  mesaurementj
+    ·  sizej +    ·  mbaj +  ej (M3.2)
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Table  2  shows  descriptive  statistics  for  independent  and
ontrol  variables  included  in  the  models  to  be  estimated.
vidence
his  section  ﬁrst  describes  capital  budgeting  practices  in  our
ample  and  presents  a univariate  analysis  of  the  relationship
etween  them  and  characteristics  of  ﬁrms  and  CFOs.  Next,
t  shows  and  discusses  the  main  results  from  testing  our
xplanatory  hypotheses.  Finally,  we  perform  and  comment
n  a  number  of  robustness  checks.
apital  budgeting  practices
able  3  summarizes  CFOs’  answers  to  the  question  con-
erning  the  frequency  with  which  each  of  the  six  capital
udgeting  techniques  is  used.  PB  and  IRR  are  the  most  pop-
lar  techniques  among  CFOs  in  our  sample.  PB  is  always  or
lmost  always  used  by  75.0%  of  companies  and  IRR  by  74.1%.
PV  is  always  or  almost  always  used  by  65.7%  of  companies.
he  real  options  model  is  the  least  popular  technique:  only
4%  of  the  CFOs  in  our  sample  reported  using  this  model
lways  or  almost  always.  Sensitivity  analysis  and  simulation
odels  are  always  or  almost  always  used  by  about  half  of
he  companies  (54.4%  and  47.5%,  respectively).
The  results  concerning  PB  and  IRR  prevalence  are  sim-
lar  to  those  obtained  in  previous  studies  for  British  and
panish  companies.  Brounen  et  al.  (2004)  found  that  69.2%
f  UK  companies  always  or  almost  always  use  PB,  whereas
3.1%  and  47.0%  use  IRR  and  NPV,  respectively.  In  Rayo  et  al.
2007),  frequency  rates  indicated  by  Spanish  ﬁrms  are  80.8%,
9.6%  and  78.6%,  respectively,  for  PB,  IRR  and  NPV.  In  the
ase  of  U.S.  companies,  we  must  go  back  as  far  as  1978  to
nd  evidence  of  a  similar  PB  prevalence:  Schall  et  al.  (1978)
ound  that  74%  of  U.S.  ﬁrms  always  or  almost  always  used  PB,
5%  IRR,  and  56%  NPV.  Our  survey  also  reveals  that  the  14%
f  companies  in  our  sample  that  always  or  almost  always  use
eal  options  is  lower  than  that  reported  in  previous  studies:
6.6%  in  North  America  (Graham  and  Harvey,  2001),  29.0%  in
he  UK,  34.7%  in  the  Netherlands,  44.0%  in  Germany,  53.1%
n  France  (Brounen  et  al.,  2004),  and  17.1%  in  Spain  (Rayo
t  al.,  2007).
As  in  Bierman  (1993),  Pike  (1996), Arnold  and  Hatzopoulos
2000)  and  Verbeeten  (2006),  our  survey  results  indicate  that
panish  companies  simultaneously  use  several  capital  bud-
eting  techniques.  Fig.  3  shows  the  number  of  techniques
dopted  by  ﬁrms.  The  average  number  of  techniques  is  3.76
with  a  standard  deviation  of  1.76),  with  over  40%  of  compa-
ies  using  at  least  ﬁve  different  methods.  Outliers  indicate
hat  4.3%  of  CFOs  do  not  use  any  of  these  six  techniques  and
hat  20.0%  of  CFOs  use  all  of  them  simultaneously.
Table  4  shows  the  relationship  between  techniques  used
y  a  single  company.  The  high  correlation  between  NPV  and
RR  indicates  that  CFOs  frequently  apply  them  together.  The
orrelations  between  IRR  and  PB,  and  between  NPV  and
B,  are  also  signiﬁcant.  This  association  between  techniques
eems  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  CFOs  tend  to  succes-
ively  accumulate  techniques  in  order  to:  (i)  avoid  replacing
ore  familiar  tools  with  others  which  are  theoretically  bet-
er  (Verbeeten,  2006);  and  (ii)  collect  multiple  results,  in
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics  of  independent  and  control  variables.  This  table  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  our  sample
of ﬁrms.  For  each  variable,  it  shows  the  number  of  observations  (N);  mean  (Mean);  standard  deviation  (SD);  minimum  (Min);
maximum (Max);  and  for  categorized  variables  their  relative  frequencies.  Variables  are  deﬁned  as  follows:  size  is  the  natural
logarithm of  sales;  mba  is  a  dummy  taking  the  value  of  1  if  the  CFO  holds  an  MBA  or  Master’s  Degree  in  Finance,  and  zero  otherwise;
involvement is  a  four-level  categorized  variable  ordered  from  lowest  to  highest  CFO  involvement  in  investment  decisions;  ltdebt
is the  quotient  of  long-term  debt  and  total  assets;  valuation  is  a  categorized  variable  which  takes  ﬁve  levels  from  never  to  daily,
according to  the  frequency  with  which  the  ﬁrm  value  is  estimated  by  CFOs;  growth  is  a  categorized  variable  which  takes  ﬁve
levels reﬂecting  the  frequency  with  which  past  investments  open  up  new  opportunities  to  invest,  and  the  variables  of  switch,
modify, and  defer  are  categorized  variables  which  take  ﬁve  levels  reﬂecting  the  relative  importance  of,  respectively,  the  option
to switch  inputs,  modify  investment  size,  and  defer  investments,  in  the  ﬁrm’s  usual  capital  investments.
Variable  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max  0  1  2  3  4  5
size  135  5.5 1.5 1.1 11.2 -- --  --  --  --  --
mba 132  0.5 0.5 0  1  51.5% 48.5% -- -- --  --
involvement  130  3.2  0.8  1  4  --  3.1%  16.9%  35.4%  44.6%  --
ltdebt 100  0.2  0.2  0  1.1  --  --  --  --  --  --
ownership 133  0.1  0.3  0  1  89.5%  10.5%
valuation  132  1.4  1.1  0  4  15.9%  55.3%  9.9%  14.4%  4.6%  --
growth 136  3.1  1.1  1  5  --  7.4%  28.7%  21.3%  33.1%  9.6%
switch 136  3.2  1.0  1  5  --  6.6%  14.0%  45.6%  24.3%  9.6%
defer 138  3.1  1.1  1  5  --  6.5%  22.5%  30.4%  31.2%  9.4%
modify 139  3.6  0.9  1  5  --  1.4%  8.6%  29.5%  46.0%  14.4%
Table  3  Capital  budgeting  practices.  This  table  presents  CFOs’  answers  on  a  scale  of  ﬁve  levels,  from  lowest  to  highest,  to
the question  concerning  the  frequency  with  which  each  of  the  six  capital  budgeting  techniques  is  used.  ‘‘Average’’  represents
the mean  frequency  of  use  of  each  technique,  obtained  by  assigning  consecutive  values  from  1  to  5  to  the  successive  response
levels from  lowest  (never)  to  highest  (always).
Technique  Number  of  observations  Percentage  of  companies  using  the  technique  Average
Never  Sometimes  Commonly  Almost  always  Always
NPV  140  5.0%  11.4%  17.9%  17.1%  48.6%  3.93
IRR 139  2.9%  7.9%  15.1%  19.4%  54.7%  4.15
PB 140  3.6%  6.4%  15.0%  24.3%  50.7%  4.12
Real options  133  39.1%  21.1%  25.6%  9.0%  5.3%  2.20
Simulation models  137  13.1%  13.9%  25.5%  19.0%  28.5%  3.35
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pSensitivity analysis  136  9.6%  1any  cases  redundant,  to  reinforce  their  investment  pro-
osals  under  uncertainty  (Arnold  and  Hatzopoulos,  2000).
Consistent  with  this  idea,  Table  5  reports  which  other
ools  are  (always  and  almost  always)  used  together  with  each
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igure  3  Number  of  capital  budgeting  techniques.  Distribution  
ractices used. 19.9%  25.7%  28.7%  3.48echnique.  In  92  of  the  cases  in  which  CFOs  indicate  use  of
PV,  they  also  adopt  IRR  and  PB.  Similar  behaviour  can  be
bserved  among  users  of  the  latter  two  techniques.  How-
ver,  the  reinforcement  needed  for  real  options,  simulation
%
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of  companies  according  to  the  number  of  capital  budgeting
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Table  4  Correlation  between  capital  budgeting  practices.  This  table  shows  correlation  coefﬁcients  between  capital  budgeting
techniques. Each  variable  is  deﬁned  as  the  frequency  with  which  each  capital  budgeting  tool  is  used  by  CFOs  according  to  the
scores given  on  a  scale  of  5  levels  (from  ‘‘never’’  to  ‘‘always’’).
NPV  IRR  PB  Real  options  Simulation  Sensitivity
NPV  1.0000
IRR  0.7812*** 1.0000
PB 0.4608*** 0.5606*** 1.0000
Real options 0.1237 0.1782** 0.1725** 1.0000
Simulation  0.1966** 0.3564*** 0.2788*** 0.2316*** 1.0000
Sensitivity  0.5025*** 0.5128*** 0.2468*** 0.1386  0.5903*** 1.0000
f
T
N
P
a
i
e
q
(
e
t
a
u
o
o
u
ﬁ
b
q
l
m
i
u
a
N
t
l
c** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
and  sensitivity  analysis  models  seems  even  higher,  as  indi-
cated  by  the  fact  they  tend  to  be  used  together  with  four
other  different  tools.
Tables  6  and  7  show  the  relation  between  the  frequency
of  use  for  each  capital  budgeting  technique  and,  respec-
tively,  ﬁrm  and  CFO  characteristics.  Variables  included  in
this  analysis  are  those  usually  considered  in  prior  literature
and  used  in  the  section  ‘‘Sample:  ﬁrm  and  CFO  characteris-
tics’’  to  describe  the  sample.  The  values  for  these  variables
are  obtained  directly  from  CFOs’  answers  to  the  survey.
Firm  characteristics  cover  size  (on  the  basis  of  the  nat-
ural  logarithm  of  million  euros  sales);  industry  dummies
(according  to  the  primary  business  being  classiﬁed  as  Energy,
Manufacturing,  Consumer  goods,  Services,  Real  estate  and
Telecommunications);  legal  status  (a  dummy  that  takes  the
value  of  1  in  the  case  of  Corporations  and  zero  for  Limited
Liability  Companies),  and  foreign  investment  (a  dummy  tak-
ing  the  value  of  1 if  the  ﬁrm  invests  overseas  and  zero
otherwise).  CFO  characteristics  cover  age  (a  categorized
variable  of  ﬁve  levels  from  lowest  to  highest);  time  spent
working,  time  spent  in  the  current  company,  and  time  as
CFO  (directly  measured  by  the  number  of  years  in  each  posi-
tion);  educational  level  (a  dummy  taking  the  value  1  if  an
MBA  or  Master’s  Degree  in  Finance  is  held,  and  zero  other-
wise),  board  of  director  position  (a  dummy  that  takes  the
value  of  1 when  a  position  is  held  on  the  board  of  directors
and  zero  otherwise),  and  involvement  in  capital  investment
decisions  (a  four-level  categorized  variable  ordered  from
lowest  to  highest  involvement).  To  analyze  the  individual
effect  of  each  of  these  characteristics  on  the  frequency
of  use  of  each  technique,  we  estimated  univariate  ordered
probit  regressions.
Table  6  presents  the  results  for  the  inﬂuence  of  ﬁrm  char-
acteristics.  We  ﬁnd  that  ﬁrm  size  has  a  positive  impact  on  the
d
i
v
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Table  5  Number  of  conditional  practices.  This  table  presents  wh
with each  technique.
Companies  Other  practices  NPV  IR
NPV  92  2  X
IRR 103  2  X  
PB 105  2  X  X
Real options  19  3  X  X
Simulation  65  4  X  X
Sensitivity 74  4  X  Xrequency  of  use  of  all  the  techniques,  except  real  options.
he  larger  the  company,  the  greater  the  propensity  to  use
PV,  IRR,  sensitivity  analysis,  simulation  models  and  even
B.  Graham  and  Harvey  (2001)  and  Brounen  et  al.  (2004)
lso  ﬁnd  that  larger  ﬁrms  tend  to  use  NPV,  IRR  and  sensitiv-
ty  analysis  more  frequently.  Payne  et  al.  (1999)  and  Hermes
t  al.  (2007)  observe  that  larger  ﬁrms  adopt  NPV  more  fre-
uently,  while  Moore  and  Reichert  (1983)  and  Baker  et  al.
2011a)  provide  similar  evidence  in  the  case  of  TIR.  How-
ver,  our  results  differ  from  previous  research  as  regards
he  positive  relationship  between  size  and  PB.  In  Graham
nd  Harvey  (2001)  and  Hermes  et  al.  (2007),  larger  ﬁrms
se  PB  less  often  than  smaller  ﬁrms,  whereas  we  ﬁnd  the
pposite  relation  for  Spanish  companies.
The  effect  of  industry  on  frequency  of  use  varies  from
ne  technique  to  another.  PB  is  used  more  often  by  man-
facturing  ﬁrms,  but  less  often  by  services  and  real  estate
rms,  NPV,  IRR  and  sensitivity  analysis  are  used  more  often
y  real  estate  ﬁrms,  and  simulation  models  are  more  fre-
uently  used  by  consumer  goods  ﬁrms.  According  to  their
egal  status,  we  ﬁnd  that  Corporations  used  NPV  and  IRR
ore  often  than  Limited  Liability  Companies.  Finally,  results
n  Table  6  show  that  NPV,  IRR,  PB  and  sensitivity  analysis  are
sed  more  often  by  companies  investing  overseas.  Graham
nd  Harvey  (2001)  ﬁnd  that  companies  with  foreign  sales  use
PV  and  IRR  more  often,  although  Hermes  et  al.  (2007)  note
hat  these  are  precisely  the  companies  that  tend  to  use  PB
ess  frequently.
Table  7  presents  the  results  for  the  inﬂuence  of  CFO
haracteristics.  As  a  whole,  we  ﬁnd  that  frequency  of  use
oes  not  depend  on  CFO  proﬁle.  Among  all  these  variables,
nvolvement  in  capital  investment  decisions  seems  to  be  the
ariable  with  the  highest  impact  on  the  frequency  of  use  of
ve  of  the  six  techniques.  The  only  exception  is  the  real
ich  other  tools  are  (always  and  almost  always)  used  together
R  PB  Real  options  Simulation  Sensitivity
 X
X
 X
 X  X
 X  X
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Table  6  Firm  characteristics  and  capital  budgeting  techniques.  This  table  presents  univariate  ordered  probit  regression
coefﬁcients  and  pseudo  R2 (below  in  italics),  where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  frequency  of  use  of  each  technique  (in
columns) and  the  independent  variable  is  one  of  the  ﬁrm’s  characteristics  (in  rows).  The  dependent  variable  is  deﬁned  as  the
frequency with  which  each  capital  budgeting  tool  is  used  by  CFOs  according  to  the  scores  given  on  a  scale  of  ﬁve  levels  (from
‘‘never’’ to  ‘‘always’’).  Independent  variables  are  deﬁned  as  follows:  size  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  million  euros  sales;  industry
dummies according  to  the  primary  business  are  energy,  manufacturing,  consumer  goods,  services, real  estate  and  telecommu-
nications; legal  status  is  a  dummy  that  takes  the  value  1  in  the  case  of  Corporations  and  zero  for  Limited  Liability  Companies,
and foreign  investment  is  a  dummy  taking  the  value  1  if  the  ﬁrm  invests  overseas  and  zero  otherwise.
NPV  IRR  PB  Real  options  Simulation  Sensitivity
size  0.243*** 0.213*** 0.235*** 0.028  0.153** 0.225***
0.0326 0.0263 0.0341 0.0005  0.0144  0.0279
energy −0.180 −0.214 0.245 −0.083  0.340  0.170
0.0007 0.0012 0.0014 0.0002 0.0027 0.0007
manufacturing  0.016  0.085  0.435** 0.136  −0.052  −0.212
0.0000 0.0005  0.0132  0.0013  0.0002  0.0030
consumer goods  0.038  −0.088  0.293  −0.273  0.445* 0.162
0.0001 0.0003  0.0032  0.0026  0.0067  0.0009
services −0.209  −0.195  −0.539*** −0.189  −0.380* −0.138
0.0029 0.0027  0.0203  0.0024  0.0089  0.0012
real estate 0.813* 1.082* −0.781** 0.711  0.114  0.735*
0.0087 0.0120 0.0110  0.0066  0.0002  0.0080
telecommunications  4.975  4.7510  4.917  1.042  0.578  0.501
0.0079 0.0074  0.0079  0.0056  0.0013  0.0010
legal status 0.442** 0.523** 0.283 0.329 0.185  0.263
0.0105 0.0154 0.0045  0.0054  0.0017  0.0035
foreign investments  0.330* 0.434** 0.349* 0.193  0.310  0.373**
0.0080  0.0144  0.0094  0.0027  0.0067  0.0098
* p < 0.1.
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with  which  CFOs  estimate  their  ﬁrm  value  is  positively  asso-
ciated  to  how  often  real  options  and  simulation  models  are
used,  which  are  precisely  the  two  techniques  whose  use  isp < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
ption  model,  which  is  not  affected  by  any  of  the  CFO  char-
cteristics  considered.  This  result  differs  from  the  positive
elationship  found  by  Rayo  et  al.  (2007)  between  the  level
f  involvement  and  the  use  of  real  options.  Table  7  indicates
hat  sensitivity  analysis  is  used  less  by  those  who  have  more
ears  of  experience  in  the  company  and  is  used  more  often
y  those  who  hold  an  MBA  or  a  Master’s  Degree  in  Finance.
raham  and  Harvey  (2001)  ﬁnd  that  managers  with  greater
xperience  use  NPV  and  IRR  less  often  and  PB  more  often.
revious  research  shows  that  having  an  MBA  encourages  use
f  discounted  cash  ﬂow  models  (Graham  and  Harvey,  2001;
rounen  et  al.,  2004;  Hermes  et  al.,  2007) and  sensitivity
nalysis  (Brounen  et  al.,  2004;  Chazi  et  al.,  2010).  Finally,
ur  results  do  not  conﬁrm  prior  evidence  concerning  the  pos-
tive  effect  of  CFO  age  on  the  frequency  of  use  of  PB  (Graham
nd  Harvey,  2001)  and  NPV  (Hermes  et  al.,  2007).
est  of  hypotheses
able  8  presents  the  results  of  the  multivariate  ordered
robit  estimation  used  to  test  Hypothesis  1  which  pre-
icts  that  mechanisms  aligning  managerial  and  shareholder
ncentives  increase  the  tendency  to  use  theoretically  more
ppropriate  models.  For  each  technique,  Table  8  displays
m
owo  columns  with  coefﬁcients,  standard  errors  and  marginal
rrors  for  independent  variables  in  two  different  model
peciﬁcations.11 In  Model  M1.1, alignment  mechanisms  are
easured  by  the  variables  of  long-term  debt  (ltdebt)  and
anagerial  ownership  (ownership), whereas  in  Model  M1.2
his  latter  variable  is  replaced  by  the  frequency  with  which
he  value  of  the  ﬁrm  is  estimated  (valuation).
These  results  indicate  that  among  those  alignment  mech-
nisms,  only  the  coefﬁcient  of  ﬁrm  valuation  is  statistically
ifferent  from  zero.  Graham  and  Harvey  (2001)  reported
hat  long-term  debt  encouraged  the  use  of  NPV,  IRR  and
ensitivity  analysis  techniques,  and  managerial  ownership
avoured  the  use  of  PB,  and  discouraged  adopting  NPV  and
RR.  Contrary  to  prior  research,  we  ﬁnd  that  long-term  debt
nd  managerial  ownership  do  not  affect  how  often  any  of  the
ix  techniques  are  used.  However,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  frequency11 As explained in the section ‘‘Variables and econometric
odels’’, these two model speciﬁcations are deﬁned on the basis
f statistical correlation of independent variables.
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Table  7  CFO  characteristics  and  capital  budgeting  techniques.  This  table  presents  univariate  ordered  probit  regression
coefﬁcients  and  pseudo  R2 (below  in  italics),  where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  frequency  of  use  of  each  technique  (in
columns) and  the  independent  variable  is  one  of  the  CFO’s  characteristics  (in  rows).  The  dependent  variable  is  deﬁned  as  the
frequency with  which  each  capital  budgeting  tool  is  used  by  CFOs  according  to  the  scores  given  on  a  scale  of  5  levels  (from
‘‘never’’ to  ‘‘always’’).  Independent  variables  are  deﬁned  as  follows:  age  is  a  categorized  variable  of  ﬁve  levels  from  lowest  to
highest; yearsworking  is  the  number  of  years  spent  working;  yearscompany  is  the  number  of  years  spent  in  the  current  company;
yearscfo is  the  number  of  years  as  CFO;  mba  is  a  dummy  taking  the  value  1  if  an  MBA  or  Master’s  Degree  in  Finance  is  held,  and
zero otherwise,  director  is  a  dummy  that  takes  the  value  1  when  a  position  is  held  on  the  board  of  directors  and  zero  otherwise;
and involvement  is  a  four-level  categorized  variable  ordered  from  lowest  to  highest  involvement  in  investment  decisions.
NPV  IRR  PB  Real  options  Simulation  Sensitivity
age  −0.599 0.018 0.166  −0.084  0.034  −0.039
0.0008 0.0000 0.0062 0.0015 0.0002  0.0003
yearsworking  −0.003 0.001 0.014 −0.002 −0.001 −0.007
0.0002  0.0000  0.0040  0.0001  0.0000  0.0008
yearscompany  −0.006  −0.002  0.004  −0.011  −0.004  −0.022**
0.0009  0.0001  0.0004  0.0027  0.0003  0.0109
yearscfo −0.013  −0.017  0.000  −0.004  −0.009  −0.011
0.0022 0.0039 0.0000  0.0001  0.0010  0.0013
mba 0.261  0.218  0.250  −0.063  0.230  0.520***
0.0050  0.0037  0.0048  0.0003  0.0037  0.0190
director −0.110 −0.031 0.245  0.264  0.077  0.037
0.0008 0.0001 0.0038 0.0043 0.0004  0.0001
involvement  0.289** 0.326*** 0.316*** −0.016  0.216* 0.358***
0.0172  0.0229  0.0216  0.0001  0.0092  0.0248
* p < 0.1.
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tp < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
not  affected  by  company  size.  This  evidence  suggests  that
a  higher  value  creation  orientation,  as  revealed  by  the  fre-
quency  of  ﬁrm  value  estimation,  explains  the  use  of  real
options  and  simulation  models  better  than  ﬁrm  size  or  CFO
background  do.
Our  results  conﬁrm  prior  evidence  concerning  the  more
frequent  use  of  NPV,  IRR,  PB  and  sensitivity  analysis  by  the
larger  companies.  Additionally,  the  estimated  coefﬁcients
of  MBA  suggest  that  postgraduate  education  favours  the  use
of  PB  and  sensitivity  analysis.  Although  this  effect  of  higher
education  might  seem  surprising,  it  conﬁrms  prior  results
obtained  by  Brounen  et  al.  (2004)  for  UK  and  German  com-
panies  and  how  often  PB  and  sensitivity  analysis  are  used,
respectively.
Table  8  also  presents  marginal  effects  for  independent
and  control  variables.  The  marginal  effects  shown  are  calcu-
lated  for  each  technique  on  the  highest  level  of  its  frequency
of  use,  which  corresponds  to  applying  it  ‘‘always’’.  Esti-
mated  marginal  effects  indicate  that  the  size  of  the  ﬁrm
increases  the  use  of  NPV,  IRR,  PB  and  sensitivity  analysis
by  around  6--9%.  The  marginal  effect  of  CFO  education  is
even  higher  for  adopting  PB  and  sensitivity  analysis,  with
estimated  values  above  15%.  These  effects  are  countered
with  the  negative  inﬂuence  of  long-term  debt,  which  shows
a  negative  marginal  effect  of  27%  and  above.  Shareholder
orientation,  as  measured  by  the  frequency  of  ﬁrm  valuation,
presents  a  marginal  effect  of  3.3  and  6.7%,  respectively,  in
adopting  real  options  and  simulation  models.
i
w
(
tIn  sum,  we  ﬁnd  little  support  for  Hypothesis  1. Neither  the
redicted  pressure  of  long-term  debt  on  managerial  deci-
ions,  nor  the  convergence  of  interests  of  managers  and
hareholders  associated  to  managerial  ownership  seem  to
ncourage  choosing  theoretically  superior  techniques.  The
nly  alignment  mechanism  that  appears  to  inﬂuence  fre-
uency  of  use  of  more  sophisticated  techniques  is  how  often
FOs  estimate  the  value  of  the  ﬁrm.  Considered  together,
hese  ﬁndings  reveal  that  a  ﬁrm’s  actual  shareholder  orien-
ation  seems  to  encourage  frequent  use  of  real  options  and
imulation  models,  although  possible  deviations  towards  the
se  of  inappropriate  tools  are  not  corrected  by  pressure  of
nterest  alignment  mechanisms  such  as  long-term  debt  or
anagement  ownership.
Results  in  Table  9  correspond  to  the  multivariate  ordered
robit  estimation  used  to  test  Hypothesis  2  which  pre-
icts  that  the  relevance  of  growth  options  and  ﬂexibility
s  sources  of  value  of  a  ﬁrm’s  capital  investments  increases
he  propensity  to  use  real  options  models.  For  each  tech-
ique,  we  estimate  two  different  model  speciﬁcations  on
he  basis  of  statistical  correlation  of  independent  variables.
n  addition  to  the  control  variables  of  ﬁrm  size  (size) and
FO  education  level  (mba), Model  M2.1  includes  the  options
o  grow  (growth),  to  switch  inputs  (switch)  and  to  modify
nvestment  dimension  (modify)  as  independent  variables,
hereas  Model  M2.2  replaces  the  options  to  switch  inputs
switch)  and  to  modify  investment  dimension  (modify)  by
he  option  to  defer  investments  (defer).
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Table  8  Mechanisms  aligning  managerial  and  shareholder  incentives  and  capital  budgeting  practices.  This  table  presents  multi-
variate probit  estimations  used  to  test  Hypothesis  1.  For  each  technique,  two  columns  are  displayed  with  regression  coefﬁcients,
standard errors  (below  in  parenthesis)  and  marginal  errors  (below  in  italics)  for  independent  and  control  variables  in  Models
M1.1  and  M1.2.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  frequency  of  use  of  each  technique  (in  columns)  and  the  independent  and  control
variables are  deﬁned  as  follows:  ltdebt  is  the  quotient  of  long-term  debt  and  total  assets;  ownership  is  a  dummy  taking  the  value
1 if  the  CFO  holds  a  stake  in  the  ﬁrm’s  equity,  and  zero  otherwise;  valuation  is  a  categorized  variable  which  takes  ﬁve  levels,
from never  to  daily,  according  to  the  frequency  with  which  the  ﬁrm  value  is  estimated  by  CFOs;  size  is  the  natural  logarithm  of
sales; and  mba  is  a  dummy  taking  the  value  1  if  the  CFO  holds  an  MBA  or  Master’s  Degree  in  Finance,  and  zero  otherwise.
NPV  IRR  PB  Real  options  Simulation  Sensitivity
M1.1  M1.2  M1.1  M1.2  M1.1  M1.2  M1.1  M1.2  M1.1  M1.2  M1.1  M1.2
ltdebt  −0.052 −0.073 0.195  0.164  −0.686 −0.745 0.521  0.526  −0.102  −0.120  0.292  0.307
(0.52) (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.51)
−0.021 −0.029  0.077  0.065  −0.274  −0.297  0.063  0.059  −0.033  −0.038  0.095  0.101
ownership 0.076  0.241  0.025  0.389  0.242  0.363
(0.37) (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.35)
0.030 0.094  0.010  0.059  0.082  0.127
valuation 0.039  0.060  0.154  0.299** 0.209* −0.004
(0.11) (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)
0.016 0.024  0.061  0.033  0.067  −0.001
size 0.220** 0.228*** 0.185** 0.194** 0.195** 0.203** 0.079  0.091  0.123  0.123  0.203** 0.202**
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)
0.088 0.09  0.073  0.077  0.077  0.081  0.009  0.010  0.039  0.039  0.066  0.066
mba 0.292  0.345  0.135  0.214  0.386  0.486** 0.048  0.205  0.002  0.062  0.479** 0.479**
(0.24)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.23)
0.116 0.137  0.053  0.084  0.153  0.192  0.006  0.023  0.001  0.020  0.156  0.157
N 96  95  95  94  96  95  90  89  94  93  94  93
LR chi2 8.17* 8.88* 5.45  5.74  9.80** 12.32** 5.44  8.45* 3.60  6.19  12.66** 10.51**
Pseudo  R2 0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.04
Log likelihood  −123.5  −122.5  −114.6  −113.9  −119.2  −117.2  −124.3  −121.9  −144.3  −140.8  −138.5  −137.2
* p < 0.1.
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*** p < 0.01.
The  growth  options  variable  (growth),  as  measured  by
he  frequency  with  which  past  investments  open  up  future
usiness  opportunities,  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  in  explain-
ng  the  use  of  real  options.  As  predicted  by  Hypothesis  2,  the
elevance  of  growth  options  among  a  ﬁrm’s  sources  of  value
ncreases  the  frequency  of  use  of  real  options,  which  is,
heoretically,  the  most  appropriate  model  to  value  projects
hat  spawn  new  opportunities  to  invest.  Relevance  of  growth
ptions  also  seems  to  promote  frequent  use  of  PB  and,  to  a
esser  extent,  simulation  models,  as  shown  by  coefﬁcient
alues  in  one  of  the  speciﬁcations  (M2.2).  The  relationship
etween  PB  and  growth  options  is  by  no  means  new  and  is  in
ine  with  arguments  used  by  McDonald  (2000)  to  explain  the
‘reasonable’’  adoption  of  heuristic  methods  (or  ‘‘rules  of
humb’’)  to  approximate  the  value  of  real  options.  Alkaraan
nd  Northcott  (2006)  compare  the  use  of  NPV,  IRR  and  PB
epending  on  the  strategic  nature  of  investments  and  ﬁnd  a
elationship  between  strategic  projects  and  the  use  of  IRR.
Among  the  variables  approximating  the  relevance  of
exibility  options,  the  options  to  modify  the  project  dimen-
ion  (modify)  and  the  option  to  defer  investments  (defer)
lso  present  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients,  supporting
ypothesis  2.  Results  in  Table  9  also  indicate  that  CFOs  use
o
T
t
eimulation  models,  together  with  real  options,  to  capture
he  value  of  the  option  to  amplify/reduce  project  dimen-
ion.  Less  easy  to  interpret  is  the  more  frequent  use  of  NPV,
RR  and  PB  in  companies  with  a  higher  relevance  of  switch
ptions  (switch)  and  NPV,  IRR,  as  well  as  sensitivity  analy-
is  in  the  cases  of  higher  relevance  of  options  to  postpone
nvestments  (defer).
Analysis  of  marginal  effects  conﬁrms  the  relevance  of
 ﬁrm’s  size  on  adopting  nearly  all  the  techniques,  apart
rom  real  options.  Marginal  effects  of  size  are  10%  or  above
or  the  frequency  of  use  of  NPV  and  IRR.  The  only  excep-
ion,  which  adds  further  predictive  power  to  Hypothesis
,  is  real  options.  In  this  case,  the  variables  with  higher
arginal  effects  are  those  measuring  the  value  relevance
f  the  options  to  grow,  defer  and  resize.  Finally,  marginal
ffects  again  conﬁrm  the  relation  between  the  frequency  of
se  of  sensitivity  analysis  and  the  CFO’s  education  level,  as
hown  in  Table  8.
The  joint  effect  of  alignment  mechanisms  and  sources
f  value  on  the  frequency  of  use  of  techniques  is  shown  in
able  10. Again,  the  table  displays  two  columns  for  each
echnique  with  coefﬁcients,  standard  errors  and  marginal
rrors,  according  to  two  different  model  speciﬁcations.
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Table  9  Sources  of  value  and  capital  budgeting  practices.  This  table  presents  multivariate  probit  estimations  used  to  test
Hypothesis  2.  For  each  technique,  two  columns  are  displayed  with  regression  coefﬁcients,  standard  errors  (below  in  parenthesis)
and marginal  errors  (below  in  italics)  for  independent  and  control  variables  in  Models  M2.1  and  M2.2.  The  dependent  variable  is
the frequency  of  use  of  each  technique  (in  columns)  and  the  independent  and  control  variables  are  deﬁned  as  follows:  growth  is
a categorized  variable  which  takes  ﬁve  levels  reﬂecting  the  frequency  with  which  past  investments  open  up  new  opportunities
to invest,  and  the  variables  of  switch,  modify,  defer  are  categorized  variables  which  take  ﬁve  levels  reﬂecting  the  relative
importance of,  respectively,  the  option  to  switch  inputs,  modify  investment  size,  and  defer  investments,  in  the  ﬁrm’s  usual
capital investments;  size  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  sales;  and  mba  is  a  dummy  taking  the  value  1  if  the  CFO  holds  an  MBA  or
Master’s Degree  in  Finance,  and  zero  otherwise.
NPV  IRR  PB  Real  options  Simulation  Sensitivity
M2.1  M2.2  M2.1  M2.2  M2.1  M2.2  M2.1  M2.2  M2.1  M2.2  M2.1  M2.2
growth  0.013  0.074  −0.047 0.044  0.129  0.188** 0.187** 0.239*** 0.096  0.152* −0.021  0.006
(0.09) (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)
0.005 0.029  −0.019  0.018  0.051  0.075  0.016  0.022  0.029  0.048  −0.006  0.002
switch 0.189* 0.275** 0.295*** 0.071  0.072  0.003
(0.10) (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)
0.076 0.108  0.117  0.006  0.022  0.001
modify 0.168  0.220* 0.028  0.316*** 0.522*** 0.190
(0.12) (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)
0.067 0.087  0.011  0.027  0.159  0.059
defer 0.267*** 0.218** −0.030  0.192** 0.118  0.168*
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)
0.106 0.086  −0.012  0.018  0.037  0.052
size 0.271*** 0.283*** 0.270*** 0.257*** 0.229*** 0.224*** 0.092  0.072  0.219*** 0.176*** 0.270*** 0.264***
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)
0.108 0.113  0.106  0.101  0.091  0.089  0.008  0.007  0.067  0.056  0.084  0.082
mba 0.183  0.179  0.066  0.110  0.042  0.102  −0.118  −0.147  0.040  0.080  0.546*** 0.509**
(0.21)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)
0.073 0.071  0.026  0.043  0.017  0.041  −0.010  −0.014  0.012  0.025  0.171  0.159
N 125  125  124  124  125  125  119  120  123  124  122  123
LR chi2 20.66*** 22.04*** 22.28*** 15.87*** 21.97*** 14.96*** 14.44** 11.02** 32.64*** 13.10** 23.73*** 24.60***
Pseudo  R2 0.06  0.07  0.07  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.06  0.06
Log likelihood −159.1  −158.3  −142.4  −146.5  −144.8  −149.1  −155.9  −158.5  −176.9  −188.0  −178.4  −179.3
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
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Model  M3.1  considers  the  variables  of  the  options  to  grow
(growth),  switch  inputs  (switch)  and  modify  project  dimen-
sion  (modify)  together  with  long-term  debt  (ltdebt) and
managerial  ownership  (ownership) and  the  control  varia-
bles  of  size  (size) and  CFO  educational  level  (mba), whereas
Model  M3.2  replaces  the  variable  of  managerial  ownership
(ownership) by  the  frequency  with  which  the  value  of  the
ﬁrm  is  estimated  (valuation).  These  results  show  that  the
effect  of  a  ﬁrm’s  sources  of  value  prevails  over  that  of
the  alignment  mechanisms.  They  also  conﬁrm  the  signiﬁ-
cant  inﬂuence  of  the  relevance  of  growth  options  on  the
frequency  of  use  of  real  options  and  PB  and  the  relevance
of  the  option  to  resize  investments  on  the  frequency  of
use  of  real  options  and  simulation  models.  The  relevance
of  the  ﬂexibility  to  switch  inputs  reappears  associated  to
NPV,  IRR  and  PB,  and  also  repeats  the  relation  between  CFO
educational  level  and  the  use  of  sensitivity  analysis  (with
higher  marginal  effects  at  15%).  Finally,  joint  consideration
F
a
w
vf  alignment  mechanisms  and  sources  of  value  bears  out
he  notion  that  in  the  case  of  PB  the  variable  of  long-
erm  debt  acts  as  a  counterweight  (with  negative  marginal
ffects  above  34%)  over  the  positive  and  statistically  signif-
cant  inﬂuence  of  size  and  the  options  to  grow  and  switch
nputs.
obustness  analysis
o  check  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  to  alternative  def-
nitions  of  our  variables  we  re-estimated  our  models  with
s  many  modiﬁcations  as  allowed  by  our  available  data.
verall,  we  ﬁnd  that  our  main  results  remain  unchanged.
irstly,  including  the  industry  dummy  variables  does  not
ffect  the  sign  and  signiﬁcance  of  coefﬁcients.  Secondly,
e  replace  the  long-term  debt  variable  by  the  total  debt
ariable  as  a  measure  of  alignment  mechanisms  in  Models
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Table  10  Mechanisms  aligning  managerial  and  shareholder  incentives  and  sources  of  value.  This  table  presents  multivariate
probit estimations  used  to  test  Hypotheses  1  and  2  jointly.  For  each  technique,  two  columns  are  displayed  with  regression
coefﬁcients,  standard  errors  (below  in  parenthesis)  and  marginal  errors  (below  in  italics)  for  independent  and  control  variables
in Models  M3.1  and  M3.2.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  frequency  of  use  of  each  technique  (in  columns)  and  the  independent
and control  variables  are  deﬁned  as  in  Tables  8  and  9.
NPV  IRR  PB  Real  options Simulation  Sensitivity
M3.1  M3.2  M3.1  M3.2  M3.1  M3.2  M3.1  M3.2  M3.1  M3.2  M3.1  M3.2
growth  0.072  0.091  −0.001  0.019  0.235** 0.224** 0.223** 0.199* 0.097  0.089  −0.050  −0.038
(0.11) (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)
0.029 0.036  −0.000 0.007  0.094  0.089  0.019  0.017  0.029  0.027  −0.016  −0.012
switch 0.371*** 0.361*** 0.461*** 0.458*** 0.428*** 0.409*** 0.024  0.045  0.049  0.081  0.079  0.113
(0.13) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)
0.148 0.144  0.182  0.181  0.171  0.163  0.002  0.004  0.015  0.024  0.025  0.036
modify −0.001  0.011  −0.029  −0.015  −0.144  −0.162  0.341** 0.336** 0.464*** 0.471*** −0.041  −0.021
(0.15) (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)
−0.000 0.004  −0.012  −0.005  −0.057  −0.064  0.029  0.029  0.139  0.142  −0.013  −0.007
ltdebt −0.187  −0.158  0.048  0.050  −0.863  −0.871  0.730  0.708  −0.003  −0.008  0.347  0.367
(0.54) (0.54)  (0.54)  (0.54)  (0.55)  (0.54)  (0.53)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.52)
−0.074 −0.063  0.019  0.020  −0.344  −0.348  0.063  0.062  −0.001  −0.003  0.110  0.117
ownership −0.076 0.074  −0.152 0.364  0.145  0.349
(0.38) (0.40)  (0.37)  (0.35)  (0.34)  (0.36)
−0.030 0.029  −0.061  0.039  0.045  0.119
valuation −0.080  −0.081  0.060  0.117  0.040  −0.074
(0.13) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)
−0.031 −0.032  0.024  0.010  0.012  −0.024
size 0.222** 0.227** 0.209** 0.213** 0.157* 0.159* 0.142  0.147  0.183** 0.177** 0.220*** 0.222***
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)
0.089 0.091  0.082  0.084  0.063  0.063  0.012  0.013  0.055  0.053  0.070  0.071
mba 0.304  0.279  0.134  0.127  0.294  0.328  0.002  0.080  −0.058  −0.080  0.562** 0.521**
(0.26)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.25)
0.121 0.111  0.053  0.050  0.117  0.130  0.000  0.007  −0.017  −0.024  0.178  0.166
N 92  91  91  90  92  91  86  85  90  89  90  89
LR chi2 19.07*** 19.51*** 19.60*** 19.77*** 25.77*** 25.85*** 15.63** 15.26** 17.31** 17.86** 15.24** 13.78*
Pseudo  R2 0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.05
Log likelihood  −113.1  −112.2  −102.1  −101.4  −104.8  −104.1  −112.0  −111.3  −131.2  −128.7  −131.5  −129.9
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
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1  and  M3,  and  ﬁnd  results  similar  to  previous  analyses.12
hirdly,  we  replace  the  control  variables  of  ﬁrm  size  and  CFO
ducational  level  by  foreign  investments  (fdi),  CFO  involve-
ent  in  investment  decisions  (involvement) and  CFO’s  years
n  the  ﬁrm  (ﬁrmtenure)  variables.13 Results  do  not  dif-
er  essentially  in  Model  M1,  but  testing  of  Hypothesis  2
s  strengthened  by  changes  in  joint  signiﬁcance  of  Model
2.  Table  11  shows  that  models  lose  joint  signiﬁcance  in
12 For reasons of space we do not include these results here, but
nterested readers can obtain them on request directly from the
uthors.
13 We do not include all of the control variables together due to
he strong correlation between some of them.
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Fxplaining  the  ﬁve  most  commonly  used  techniques  but  gain
tatistical  signiﬁcance  for  the  use  of  real  options,  which
as  previously  shown  to  be  the  only  technique  that  evi-
enced  no  statistical  relation  with  the  ﬁrm’s  size.  Relevance
f  the  options  to  grow  and  to  modify  project  dimension
aintain  the  signiﬁcance  of  their  coefﬁcients  as  predicted
y  Hypothesis  2.  The  foreign  investments  variable  only
ffects  the  frequency  of  use  of  real  options,  indicating  that
hile  not  necessarily  being  the  largest  ones,  ﬁrms  com-
etitive  enough  to  invest  overseas,  are  those  which  use
eal  options  more  often.  Consistent  with  univariate  anal-
sis  results,  Table  11  shows  that  CFOs  who  use  sensitivity
nalysis  more  often  are  those  with  fewer  years  in  the  com-
any  but  who  are  more  involved  in  investment  decisions.
requency  of  use  of  NPV,  IRR  and  PB  is  again  positively
Capital  budgeting  practices  in  Spain  53
Table  11  Robustness  analysis:  control  variables.  This  table  presents  robustness  analysis  to  test  sensitivity  of  results  to  the  def-
inition of  control  variables.  For  each  technique,  columns  show  regression  coefﬁcients  and  standard  errors  (below  in  parenthesis)
from multivariate  ordered  probit  regressions.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  frequency  of  use  of  each  technique  (in  columns)
and the  independent  variables  are  deﬁned  as  in  Tables  8  and  9.  Control  variables  are  deﬁned  as  follows:  foreign  investment
is a  dummy  taking  the  value  1  if  the  ﬁrm  invests  overseas  and  zero  otherwise;  yearscompany  is  the  number  of  years  spent  in
current company;  and  involvement  is  a  four-level  categorized  variable  ordered  from  lowest  to  highest  involvement  in  investment
decisions.
NPV  IRR  PB  Real  options  Simulation  Sensitivity
growth  0.206* 0.053  0.243** 0.237** 0.050  −0.002
(0.12) (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)
switch 0.293** 0.368** 0.337** −0.017  0.025  0.033
(0.14) (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14)
modify −0.064 −0.004 −0.149 0.344** 0.435*** −0.006
(0.16) (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.15)
ltdebt −0.224  0.068  −1.075* 0.750  −0.343  0.116
(0.61) (0.59)  (0.60)  (0.61)  (0.59)  (0.59)
valuation −0.147  −0.130  0.001  0.069  0.063  −0.141
(0.13) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)
fdi 0.112  0.235  0.241  0.578** 0.320  0.310
(0.27) (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.26)
involvement  0.246  0.189  0.156  −0.243  0.164  0.367**
(0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.15)
yearscompany  0.002  0.010  0.006  −0.004  −0.008  −0.031**
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)
N 85  85  85  80  83  83
LR chi2 14.51* 14.01* 20.44*** 19.54** 14.47* 16.81**
Pseudo  R2 0.06  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.06  0.07
Log likelihood  −109.1  −100.2  −100.5  −101.0  −121.4  −119.8
* p < 0.1.
m
r
M
d
o
e
t
T
s
a
o
t
o
t
a
u
C
I
p** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
related  to  the  relevance  of  the  options  to  switch  inputs
and  to  grow  (for  NPV  and  PB).  More  importantly,  this  new
estimation  reinforces  the  statistical  signiﬁcance  of  the  rela-
tionship  between  long-term  debt  and  PB,  indicating  that
the  disciplinary  power  of  debt  discourages  CFO  tendency
to  use  it,  although  it  does  not  serve  to  explain  greater
use  of  techniques  such  as  NPV,  real  options  or  simula-
tion.
One  ﬁnal  issue  which  merits  further  analysis  is  the  mea-
surement  of  dependent  variables.  Following  prior  research,
throughout  our  paper  our  dependent  variables  have  been
deﬁned  as  ﬁve-level  ordered  variables.  Describing  capital
budgeting  practices  in  this  way  is  appropriate  to  explain
the  use  of  ‘universal’  tools,  such  as  NPV,  IRR,  PB  or  even
simulation  and  sensitivity  analysis,  since  they  are  appli-
cable  to  all  types  of  investment  projects,  whatever  their
nature.  However,  consistent  with  Hypothesis  2,  the  real
options  model  may  be  dispensable  for  projects  with  no
embedded  options.  Despite  Myers’  statement  that  it  is  hard
to  think  of  a  project  that  does  not  provide  any  option,  it
would  be  better  to  identify  companies  using  real  options  by
elimination,  removing  those  who  state  they  do  not  apply
this  model  under  any  circumstances.  From  this  perspec-
tive,  we  redeﬁned  the  dependent  variable  of  use  of  real
options  as  a  dummy  taking  the  value  zero  when  CFOs
state  they  never  apply  it  and  the  value  of  1  otherwise.
Table  12  presents  the  results  of  re-estimating  previous
h
s
i
iodel  speciﬁcations  and  this  new  deﬁnition  of  the  use  of
eal  options  as  the  dependent  variable  (Models  M4.1  to
4.4).
The  estimated  coefﬁcients  conﬁrm  that  company  ten-
ency  to  use  real  options  increases  with  the  relevance  of
ptions  to  grow  and  resize  investments.  The  main  differ-
nce  compared  to  previous  analyses  is  the  signiﬁcance  of
he  variable  of  size  in  two  of  the  model  speciﬁcations  in
able  12. Taking  this  result  together  with  previous  conclu-
ions,  we  can  interpret  that  the  size  of  the  ﬁrm  may  affect
ccess  to  real  option  models,  but  has  no  impact  on  how
ften  they  are  used.  Something  similar  could  be  said  of  long-
erm  debt.  Although  moderate,  the  statistical  signiﬁcance
f  its  coefﬁcient  indicates  that  pressure  exerted  by  long-
erm  debt  on  managerial  behaviour  seems  to  be  effective  in
dopting  real  options,  but  does  not  inﬂuence  its  frequency  of
se.
onclusion
nterest  in  whether  CFOs  apply  capital  budgeting  models  as
roposed  by  scholars  has  inspired  a  stream  of  research  which
as  produced  somewhat  disturbing  results.  Compared  to  the
peed  with  which  other  kinds  of  innovations  are  embraced
n  ﬁrms,  new  capital  budgeting  tools  are  adopted  surpris-
ngly  slowly.  It  seems  CFOs  tend  to  progressively  accumulate
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Table  12  Robustness  analysis:  dependent  variable  of  the  use  of  real  options.  This  table  presents  robustness  analysis  to  test
sensitivity of  results  to  the  deﬁnition  of  the  dependent  variable.  Columns  show  regression  coefﬁcients  and  standard  errors  (below
in parenthesis)  of  independent  and  control  variables  from  multivariate  probit  regressions.  The  dependent  variable  is  a  dummy
taking the  value  zero  when  CFOs  state  that  they  never  apply  it  and  the  value  1  otherwise.  Independent  and  control  variables
are deﬁned  as  in  Tables  8  and  9.
M4.1  M4.2  M4.3  M4.4
growth  0.249* 0.234* 0.336** 0.309**
(0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)
switch 0.124  0.151
(0.15)  (0.16)
modify  0.338* 0.335*
(0.19)  (0.19)
defer 0.207  0.188
(0.14)  (0.14)
ltdebt 1.351* 1.346* 1.366* 1.337*
(0.74)  (0.75)  (0.74)  (0.74)
ownership 0.147  0.249
(0.45) (0.44)
valuation 0.054  0.102
(0.17) (0.16)
size 0.233** 0.221* 0.172  0.169
(0.17) (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)
mba −0.435  −0.447  −0.497  −0.441
(0.31) (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.32)
const −3.478*** −3.473*** −2.441*** −2.384***
(1.14)  (1.14)  (0.90)  (0.91)
N 86  85  87  86
LR chi2 16.66** 17.15** 14.35** 14.14**
Pseudo  R2 0.14  0.15  0.12  0.12
Log likelihood  −49.8  −48.6  −51.8  −51.1
* p < 0.1.
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echniques,  and  to  avoid  abandoning  old  and  theoretically
nferior  ones.  This  diagnosis  does  not  vary  greatly  across
ountries.
This  paper  also  conﬁrms  this  pattern  for  the  Spanish
ase:  CFOs  simultaneously  use  numerous  tools,  those  being
pplied  most  often  being  precisely  the  ones  least  recom-
ended  by  scholars.  Our  ﬁndings  conﬁrm  that  the  most
avoured  technique  is  PB,  followed  some  way  back  by  IRR
nd  NPV.  The  popularity  of  PB  among  Spanish  CFOs  is  signif-
cantly  higher  than  in  other  European  and  North  American
ountries.  Exploring  possible  reasons  behind  the  popularity
f  PB  has  received  wide  attention.  Proposals  range  from  its
implicity  or  harmony  with  short-sighted  managerial  prac-
ices  to  its  usefulness  in  substituting  more  sophisticated
nd  complex  tools  to  measure  a  number  of  value  ingre-
ients  from  investments.  Our  analysis  reveals  that  PB  is
pplied  more  often  by  larger  ﬁrms,  as  are  NPV  and  IRR,  but
lso  by  CFOs  who  feel  more  involved  in  their  ﬁrm’s  cap-
tal  investments.  The  least  popular  technique  is  the  real
ptions  approach,  which  is  theoretically  the  most  appro-
riate  model  to  capture  the  value  of  strategic  investment
esults.  Contrary  to  what  has  been  argued  previously,  our
nalysis  indicates  that  how  often  this  model  is  used  does
ot  depend  on  the  size  of  the  ﬁrm  or  the  CFO’s  educational
ackground.
v
i
m
nThe  contribution  of  this  paper  goes  beyond  simply  updat-
ng  and  extending  available  evidence  for  the  case  of  Spain.
rior  research  into  the  theory  and  practice  of  capital
udgeting  techniques  has  focused  on  measuring  the  ‘‘gap’’
nd  analyzing  its  statistical  relationship  with  general  varia-
les,  such  as  the  size  of  the  ﬁrm,  the  sector  of  industry
n  which  it  operates  or  its  CFO’s  proﬁle.  Our  paper  studies
he  explanatory  power  of  complementary  arguments  based
n  the  effect  of  mechanisms  aligning  managerial  and  share-
older  incentives  or  the  relevance  of  growth  options  and
exibility  as  sources  of  investment  value.
Empirical  evidence  used  in  testing  our  hypothesis  reveals
hat  the  agency  theory  hypothesis  concerning  the  inﬂu-
nce  of  alignment  mechanisms,  such  as  debt  and  managerial
wnership,  on  managerial  behaviour,  would  not  be  directly
xtrapolated  to  capital  budgeting  practices.  Contrastingly,
ur  results  conﬁrm  the  prevalence  of  the  nature  of  sources  of
alue  in  explaining  the  choice  of  techniques  such  as  real
ptions.  Despite  being  used  little,  our  ﬁndings  indicate  that
eal  options  is  an  approach  which  has  been  adopted  more
n  companies  where  growth  and  ﬂexibility  prove  more  rele-
ant  among  their  sources  of  value.  This  result  ties  in  with  the
dea  that  the  most  appropriate  technique  is  not  always  the
ost  sophisticated  and  that  its  suitability  depends  on  the
ature  of  the  sources  of  value.  NPV  is  one  particular  case  of
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real  options,  such  that  both  techniques  report  similar  results
in  the  evaluation  of  projects  with  worthless  options.  From
this  perspective,  capital  budgeting  practices  could  not  be
judged  without  reference  to  each  ﬁrm’s  particular  sources
of  investment  value.
Apart  from  the  theory--practice  gap,  previous  empirical
studies  have  revealed  that  CFOs  often  use  more  than  one  dif-
ferent  tool  simultaneously.  The  hypothesis  of  progressively
accumulating  techniques  provides  a  valid  explanation  for
both  maintaining  ‘old’  practices  and  using  multiple  tools.
CFO  risk  aversion  and  their  concern  vis-à-vis  recommending
an  incorrect  decision  in  a  context  of  uncertainty  discourage
old  practices  from  being  abandoned  and  further  encour-
age  the  accumulation  of  multiple  and  different  calculations.
Such  a  collection  might  be  perceived  as  a  way  to  improve
analysis  efﬁciency,  particularly  when  CFOs  distrust  what  are
theoretically  the  best  techniques.  One  direct  consequence
of  such  behaviour  is  that  tools  which  are  theoretically  out-
dated  will  not  be  replaced  by  practitioners  in  the  manner
scholars  have  predicted.  This  circumstance  probably  alters
the  evidence  analyzed  and  inﬂuences  the  results  obtained  by
studies  such  as  ours,  preventing  identifying  an  even  clearer
relationship  between  the  use  of  the  most  advanced  tech-
niques  and  sources  of  value  or  alignment  mechanisms.
A  further  limitation  of  this  study  stems  from  the  econo-
metric  estimation  used  to  test  our  hypotheses.  Multivariate
ordered  probit  regressions  are  appropriate  to  the  nature
of  the  information  analyzed  and,  particularly,  ordered
multiple-level  dependent  variables.  However,  multivariate
ordered  probit  is  not  without  methodological  caveats,  espe-
cially  when  dependent  variables  do  not  adjust  to  a  normal
distribution.  One  possible  solution  --  and  a  future  research
line  --  is  the  use  of  data  mining,  such  as  the  C5.0  algorithm  or
artiﬁcial  intelligence  techniques,  which  can  help  overcome
probit  model  limitations  and  provide  additional  inductive
explanations.14
Despite  these  limitations,  this  study  heralds  a  step  for-
ward  in  bridging  the  gap  between  capital  budgeting  theory
and  practice,  and  has  implications  for  both  research  and
practice.  As  regards  research,  our  ﬁndings  suggest  the  inﬂu-
ence  of  issues  thus  far  overlooked  in  this  type  of  analysis,
whose  consideration  may  contribute  to  a  more  precise  def-
inition  of  the  problem  and,  in  any  case,  conﬁrms  the  need
for  additional  empirical  tests.  In  the  context  of  practice,
our  analysis  provides  a  more  optimistic  view  of  CFO  choice
of  mechanism,  which  seems  to  respond  to  the  nature  of
the  projects  evaluated  and  is  not  just  a  matter  of  resource
availability  and  educational  background.
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